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1

The release at issue in this case applies equally to all the Appellees in the underlying
case; therefore Appellees for the purposes of this Appeal will be collectively referred to
as "Sundance."
The Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act applies to both
equine and livestock activities equally, but this case revolves around an equine activity as
such Appellants will address it in the context of equine activities.
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(2011) and Utah R. App. P. Rule 51. This appeal is from the June
9, 2011 Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion in Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011
UT App 18, 257 P.3d 1049. Ms. Penunuri petitioned the Supreme Court of Utah for
certiorari and on October 20, 2011 the Supreme Court of Utah graciously granted
certiorari.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue on Certiorari
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in construing the Limitations on Liability for
Equine and Livestock Activities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201, et seq., to permit
releases of liability for ordinary negligence?
Standard of Review
Matters of statutory construction are purely legal conclusions, which the Supreme
Court reviews for correctness. Field v. Boyer Company, L.C. 952 P.2d 1078, 1079, (Utah
1998).
Citation to the Record
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 137-140, and R. 223-226, during Oral
Argument at R. 276 pp. 7-14, 30 and Bench Ruling at R. 277 pp. 6, 11. The issue of
statutory construction was presented to the Utah Court of Appeals in Ms. Penunuri's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Opening Brief from pp. 13-31 and in Ms. Penunuri's Reply Brief from pp 1-4 and 8-18
and during the entire oral argument.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
ADDENDUM A: Utah Code Ann §§ 78B-4-201 to 78B-4-203 (formerly Utah Code
Ann. §§78-27B-101 to 78-27B-103). Limitations on Liability for Equine
and Livestock Activities, Act;
ADDENDUM B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-4-401 to 78B-4-404 (formerly Utah Code
Ann. §§78-27-51 to 78-27-54). Inherent Risks of Skiing:
ADDENDUM C:

1992 General Legislative Session, State of Utah, House Bill 362,
Day 40, Inherent Risk of Livestock Activities, Sponsor
Representative Adams;
i

ADDENDUM D:

2003 General Legislative Session, State of Utah, Senate Bill 123,
Days 23, 25 and 39; Substitute Senate Bill, Inherent Risk of Equine
Activities, Sponsor Senator Beverly Evans;

ADDENDUM E:

Trial Court Order;

ADDENDUM F:

Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. 2011 UT App. 183, 257 P.3d
1049.

j

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:

On August 1, 2007, Arizona resident Lisa

Penunuri and her two friends from Florida arranged with Sundance Resort to go on a
guided horse ride at Sundance Stables. Sundance arranged Ms. Penunuri's ride with a
total of five riders and one guide. The riders consisted of Lisa Penunuri, her two friends
from Florida, a motherfromPark City and her eight-year-old daughter.
Ms. Penunuri, unlike her friends, was a novice rider and had not been on any
previous mountainous trail rides. Lisa'sfriendson the other hand were horse owners and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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passionate horsewomen. The others, the mother and her eight-year-old daughter, like
Lisa were very inexperienced beginning riders. The child had never been on a trail ride
before. On the day Ms. Penunuri sustained her injuries the child was celebrating her
eighth birthday. Prior to this day, the child was not even eligible to go on a trail ride
since eight was the minimum age that Sundance allowed.
The beginning order of the riders were: the guide; the eight-year-old child
("child"); the child's mother ("mom"); Ms. Penunuri; and then Ms. Penunuri's two friends
("friends"). The child had problems from the very beginning and at one point the ride
had to stop so the guide could untangle the child's reins. The order changed when the
ride began again now with the guide, thefriends,the mom, the child, and Ms. Penunuri in
the rear. The child continued to have problems controlling her horse, and the horse took
advantage of this to graze. As a result, gaps immediately began to form in the train of
horses. This continued for some time, causing concern with the friends. The friends
began to request that the guide slow down or stop and close the gaps.
The guide informed the friends that she would continue an additional hundred
yards up the trail and "pony up" (hold the reins of) the child's horse. The guide then
rounded a bend in the trail and proceeded up the trail an additional hundred plus yards.
When Ms. Penunuri's horse rounded the bend it suddenly (and unexpectedly to
Ms. Penunuri) accelerated to catch up with the heard. The unexpected acceleration
caused Ms. Penunuri to fall to the ground. Ms. Penunuri fell on her head, which resulted
in fractured neck, specifically a C5-C7 subluxation fracture of her neck with resulting
spinal cord syndrome.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although the acceleration was unexpected to the inexperienced Ms. Penunuri, it is
well known in the horse industry that horses separatedfromthe heard will eventually bolt
to catch up. It is also known within the industry that this behavior is very dangerous to
any riders, but especially dangerous to a novice rider such as Ms. Penunuri.
Sundance's own safety instructional manual provided to the guides at the
beginning of each horseback riding season addresses this issue and stresses the dangers
associated with gaps in the train of horses. It specifically warns that gaps will cause a
horse to unexpectedly accelerate and that the guides are required to prevent gaps from
forming.

Sundance was negligent when its guide allowed the gaps to form and was

further negligent when its guide did not correct the problem when she was specifically
alerted to the gaps.
Prior to the ride, all the participants were required to sign the "Sundance
Horseback Riding Release." The release purports to release Sundance for its own
negligence.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:

On January 19, 2010 the trial

court heard oral arguments and on January 29, 2010 the trial court ruled from the bench
in favor of the defendantsfindingthe pre-injury release was valid. The court rationalized
Sundance was free to waive its own negligence since the legislature did not provide the
restrictive language in the form of a public policy statement in the Limitations on
Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities act. On March 31, 2010 defendants
prepared and the court signed the Finding of Facts, Conclusion of Law, and Order
Denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiffs1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
4
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Ordinary Negligence-Based Claims. The trial court March 31, 2010 order was certified
as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b).
DISPOSITION AT THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: On April 9, 2010
Ms. Penunuri filed her Notice of Appeal. The Appellate Court determined the 54(b)
certification was improper and ordered the parties to file memorandum explaining why
summary disposition should not be granted. On August 4th 2010, this Utah Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Utah R. of App. P. Rule 5(a) elected to exercise its discretion to
treat a timely appeal from an order improperly certified as final under rule 54(b) as a
petition to appeal an interlocutory appeal. The Appeal was fully briefed and on April 18,
2011 the issues were Submitted on Oral Argument. On June 9, 2011 the Utah Court of
Appeals ruled:
[t]he plain language of the Equine Act provides statutory protection to
equine sponsor from inherent risks of equine activities. The portion of the
Equine Act excluding negligence, gross negligence, and intentional acts
from its protection does not invalidate pre-injury releases of ordinary
negligence. In addition, while the Equine Act and the Skiing Act share a
number of similarities, only the latter features a declaration of public
policy. Accordingly, while the supreme court (sic) in Rothstein had a basis
in the Skiing Act to invalidate pre-injury release, we see no equivalent basis
in the Equine Act for doing the same.
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. 2011 UT App. 183, f 20
On July 5, 2011 Ms. Penunuri filed her Writ of Certiorari. On October 20, 2011
the Supreme Court of Utah granted Ms. Penunuri Writ and this appeal ensued.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On August 1, 2007 forty-eight-year-old Lisa Penunuri and two friends

engaged Sundance for a guided horse ride. (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") at 142).
2.

All the riders were required to sign "Sundance Horseback Riding Release"

(hereinafter "release"). (R. at 190).
3.

The release purports to release Sundance from its own negligence, inherent

risks, equipment failure, and any man made obstacles. (R. at 190).
4.

The riders consisted of inexperienced and experienced riders, in particular:

Ms. Penunuri, the eight-year-old child, and her mother were inexperienced novice riders;
and Ms. Penunuri's two friends from Florida were horse owners and very experienced
horsewomen, and the professional guide. (R. at 141)
5.

During the ride, the guide permitted the least experienced riders to be in the

back of the group of riders with an eight-year-old girl second to last. (R at 141).
6.

The eight-year-old girl was unable to control her horse from grazing and as

a result large gaps began to appear in the train of horses. (R. at 11).
7.

The experienced horsewomen started noticing the gaps and asking the

guide to slow down or stop. (R. at 11).
8.

The guide informed the horsewomen that she would continue another

hundred yards up the trail and then "pony up the child." (R. at 11).
9.

The gaps created a dangerous environment that resulted in Ms. Penunuri

horse to suddenly and unexpectedly accelerate causing Ms. Penunuri to fall off. (R. at
141)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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10.

As a result of the fall off the horse Ms. Penunuri fractured her neck and

sustained spinal cord injuries. (R. at 141)
11.

It is well known in the industry and within Rocky Mountain's Outfitters

guide's training manual that gaps are a hazard that cause a horse to act in a predictable
and yet dangerous manner by suddenly accelerating to catch up to the herd. (R. at 203).
12.

The trial court determined that in order for the legislature to limit a

recreational activity sponsor from waiving its own negligence, the act passed by the
legislature must put the limitation in the form of a public policy, and Sundance was
therefore free to waive its own negligence since the Limitations on Liability for Equine
and Livestock Activities Act U.C.A. §78B-4-201 et seq. lacked a public policy statement.
(R. at 277 p.6 lines 2-17).
13.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courtsfindingsand ruled that

the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act, Utah Code Ann. §
78B-4-201, et seq. did not restrict a sponsor from limiting his liability in a pre-injury
release. {Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, at 1f20).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The canons of statutory construction reveal that the Limitations on Liability for
Equine and Livestock Activities, Act prohibits the use of pre-injury releases to release a
sponsor of an equine activity from its negligence. The act's three sections read in
harmony with each other and with other related acts in the same section reveal that the
legislature intended the equine sponsor would be immunefromliability for inherent risks,
while requiring the sponsor to remain liable for its negligence. The legislative history
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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provides additional support that the Equine Act is a bargain between the equine sponsor,
the insurance industry, and the participant.
The Equine and Livestock activity liability limitations section, 78B-4-202, plain
language states, "an equine activity sponsor . . . is not liable for an injury to or death of a
participant due to inherent risks associate with these activities, unless the sponsor or
professional. . . commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence . . ." Permitting a
sponsor to waive these restrictions in a pre-injury release would make everything after
"unless" in this section superfluous.
The Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability limitations section 78B4-203(1) requires that a sponsor provide notice to participants of inherent risks of equine
activities. Section 203(2) requires that notice to be in the form of a sign, document or a
release to be signed. Section 203(3) requires that the notice include the inherent risks in
the definition section, 201. The canons of construction, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis, provides that a general term which follows a specific term is restrained to the
definitions of the specific term. Here the specific term is notice, and notice is limited to
inherent risks, therefore, the release is also limited to releasing inherent risks.
The definition of Inherent risks found in section 201(5) includes dangers that are
an integral part of equine and livestock activities and does not encompass any negligence
on the part of the sponsor. Pursuant to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
the natural association of ideas would not permit the sponsor from including its
negligence as a inherent risks and therefore it would not be permitted to include its
negligence within the release for a participant to sign.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The whole statute interpretation is further supported by a review of the Skiing Act.
This Supreme Court of Utah determined the Skiing Act prohibited a ski operator from
limiting his liability in a pre-injury release. The Skiing Act and the Equine Act are
identical in content and nearly identical in verbiage. The difference being that the equine
act states directly that a sponsor is to be liable for his negligence, while the skiing act
does not contain this language as it did contain a public policy statement that this Court
interpreted to say that an operator could not waive: its negligence. See Rothstein v.
Snowbird Co. 2007 UT 96,110, 175 P.3d 560.
The legislative debates in 1992 and 2003 revealed that the insurance industry was
involved in enacting the legislation to limit a sponsor from having liability for inherent
risks in order to provide insurance at cheaper rates for those risks that are non-inherent.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Canons of Statutory Construction and the Legislative Debates Revealed
that Utah's Legislature Intended to Prohibit an Equine Activity Sponsor from
Waiving Its Negligence in a Pre-injury Release.
The canons of statutory construction demonstrate that the legislature intended that

the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (hereinafter "Equine
Act") would prohibit an Equine sponsorfromlimiting his liability for negligence in a preinjury release. In particular, the Equine Act reflects an effort of the legislature to protect
sponsors of equine recreational activities for liability against injuries resulting from
inherent risks of the activity or the facility, while at the same time ensuring that sponsors
manage the facility or operation in a reasonable manner requiring sponsors to act nonnegligently.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

Whether a contract made in contravention of a statute is void depends upon the
intent of the Legislature, to be determined not only jfrom the terms and provisions of the
statute itself, but from the purpose and objective sought to be accomplished by its
enactment. Neil v. Utah Wholesale Grocery Co. 210 P. 201,202, 61 Utah 22 (Utah 1922)
When faced with questions of statutory interpretation the courts1 primary goal is to
evince the true intent and purpose of the legislature. Archuleta v. St Mark's Hospital,
2010 UT 36, f8, 238 P.3d 1044 (Internal cites omitted) (finding the peer and care review
statutes clear language did not bar claims of patients based upon negligent credentialing).
The courts must do so by looking at the best evidence of legislative intent, namely the
plain language of the statute itself. Id. As part of this well-worn canon of statutory
construction courts must read the plain language as a whole. Id. Under this whole statute
interpretation the courts must construe provisions in harmony with other provisions in the
same statute and with statutes under the same and related chapters. Id. The courts do so
because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one
general purpose and intent. Id. Consequently, each part of a section should be construed
in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Id.
To determine the legislative intent of a statute and the plain language of its text,
courts have developed canons of statutory construction. Canons of construction are
basically context-dependent rules of thumb. That is to say, canons are general principles
many of them of the common-sense variety for drawing inferences about the meaning of
language. Since language derives much of its meaning from context, canons should not

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be treated as rules of law but rather as axioms of experience that do not preclude
consideration of persuasive contrary evidence if it exists.
To reach the 1) legislative intent, and the cardinal rule that the statute should be
read as a harmonious whole, the Supreme Court of Utah should look to: a) the plain
language of the statute b) the general, specific and associated words, c) statutory silence,
and d) the same paraphrasing in similar or related statutes.
If this Supreme Court finds the plain language is unambiguous, this Court does not
need to look to other interpretive tools. Id. But "if [this Court determines] the language
is ambiguous, [this] Court may look beyond the statute to 2) the legislative history ... to
ascertain the statute's intent." T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2011 UT 28,
Tf21, 254 P.3d 752. The Supreme Court of Utah determined "[w]hen viewing the act as a
whole does not eliminate duplicative yet plausible meanings, the statute is ambiguous,
and we [the Supreme Court of Utah] may resort to extrinsic interpretive tools to resolve
the ambiguity." Id. These extrinsic tools are used to "discover the underlying intent of
the legislature." Id. This discovery is "guided by the meaning and purpose of the statute
as a whole and the legislative history," Id, "and relevant policy considerations." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
1)

LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Each of the three sections of the Equine Act read in harmony demonstrate the

legislature intended that an equine activity sponsor be held liable for its own negligence.
See Archuleta 2010 UT 36 f 8. The Supreme Court of Utah determined that "in most
instances, [the courts] proper role when confronted with a statute should be restricted to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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interpreting its meaning and application as revealed through its text.

Rothstein v.

Snowbird Co. 2007 UT 96, f 10, 175 P.3d 560.
a)

Limitations (Plain language)
The Equine and livestock activity liability limitations section's 78B-4-202

(hereinafter "Liability Limitation's Section 202") plain language provides that the sponsor
is not to be held liable for inherent risks associated with equine activity yet must be held
liable for its acts or omissions of negligence. Specifically, the Liability Limitation's
Section provides:
"(2) An equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity
sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable for an injury to or the death
of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities,
unless the sponsor or professional:
(a)(i) provides the equipment or tack;
(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; and
(iii) the equipment failure was due to the sponsor's or professional's
negligence.
(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the equine or
livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the activity with the
participant;
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in the legal possession and control of land or
facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a
dangerous condition which was known to or should have been known to the
sponsor or professional and for which warning signs have not been
conspicuously posted;
d(i) commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence, gross
negligence, or willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant;
and
(ii) that act or omission causes the injury; or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to the participant.
U.C.A §78B-4-202(2)
To allow Sundance to waive these restrictions on the inherent risks in a pre-injury
release would make everything after "unless" in this Liability Limitations Section 202
superfluous. A sponsor could negligently: use equipment that was worn out; use horses
that are too spirited to be on a trail; fail to remove faiilen trees over the trail; fail to warn
of upcoming cliffs that the trail skirts; or allow large gaps between the riders, creating the
known hazard that the horses will eventually accelerate to catch up to the heard.
b)

Notice (general and specific terms).
The plain language of the Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability

limitations section 78B-4-203 (hereinafter "Notice Section 203" or "Section 203")
requires an equine activity sponsor to provide notice to the participant, warning the
participants that horse back riding has certain inherent risks.
The requirements of the Notice Section 203 provides:
Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability limitations
(1) An equine or livestock activity sponsor shall provide notice to
participants of the equine or livestock activity that there are inherent risks
of participation and that the sponsor is not liable for certain of those risks.
(2)Notice shall be provided by:
(a) posting a sign in a prominent location within the area being used
for the activity; or
(b) providing a document or release for the participant, or the
participant's legal guardian if the participant is a minor, to sign.
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(3) The notice provided by the sign or document shall be sufficient if it
includes the definition of inherent risks in Section 78B-4-201 and states
that the sponsor is not liable for those inherent risks.
U.C.A §78B-4-203
The common-sense interpretation of the Notice Section 203 is that in order for an
operator to take advantage of immunity for the inherent dangers of the Limitations on
Liability section 202, the operator must provide notice to or warn the participant of the
possibility of inherent risks or dangers.2 The legislature provided three acceptable
methods of notice in subsection 203(2), by posting a sign in a prominent location, by
providing a document, or by providing a release to sign. Subsection 203(1) in the Notice
Section limits notice only to inherent risks. This interpretation is further supported by the
canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.
Where general terms follow specific terms, the rules of construction, including
noscitur a sociis "it is known from its associates," and ejusdem generis, "of the same
kind," require that the general terms be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense that is
analogous to the preceding terms. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, (Utah, 1989) see
also, Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 369-70, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (1962). In
Heathman the Court rationalized "that if the broadest meaning of the general expression
were intended, [the expression] would have been sufficient by itself without any use of
the specific terms." Id.

2

This Notice requirement was amended in 2003 by Sen. Vallentine in order
for the Equine Act to more closely parallel the Skiing Act, see Legislative
History, infra.
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In the Equine Act's Notice Section 203, the general terms "signs to be posted,"
"documents provided" or "releases to be signed" follow the specific term "notice."
Notice is limited to inherent risks. The canons therefore would limit each of the general
terms to being analogous of the specific defined term notice and its restriction to inherent
risks. The purpose of providing the three types of notice makes sense given the broad
range of activities that the Equine Act3 is intended to cover. A sign would be appropriate
where no tickets are sold, such as at a 4H event, a document in the form of a ticket would
be most appropriate for an observer where multiple persons watch an event, such as an
observer at a polo event, and a signed release4 would be most direct and the most
appropriate for individuals who are actually participating in an event, such as a trail ride.
c)

Definitions ofInherent risks (Silence)
Although silence in statutory construction is not always telling, the interpretive

maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another, applies when in the natural association of ideas, the contrast
between a specific subject matter which is expressed and one which is not mentioned
leads to an inference that the latter was not intended! to be included within the statute.
Kocherhans v. Orem City, 2011 UT App. 399, \ 14,

P.3d

.

3

Equine Activities is defined as "equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances,
racing, sales, parades that involve any breeds of eq[uines and any equine disciplines,
including dressage, hunter and jumper, horse shows, grand pix jumping, multiple day
events, combined training, rodeos, driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeple chasing,
hunting, endurance trail riding, and western games,
(f) other activities of any type
including rides, trips, hunts, or informal or spontaneous activities sponsored by an equine
activity sponsor. U.C.A § 78B-4-201(2).
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Section 203(1) of the Notice Section limits the "notice provided" to risk that are
"inherent risks" of Equine Activities. Section 203(3) recognizes that the legislature
cannot list every possible inherent risk in all types of equine or livestock activities. The
legislature therefore required that a sponsor provide notice to the participant of the bare
minimum of inherent risks of equine activities, but it would permit the sponsor to list
additional inherent risks particular to the type of activity the sponsor ran. It would not
permit a sponsor from listing additional risks that are not inherent in the activity.
Inherent risks as defined in Section 201 are risks or dangers that are integral to
equine or livestock activities that do not encompass any negligence on the part of the
sponsor.
Specifically the Definitions9 section 78B-4-201 (hereinafter "Definitions Section
201"), defines inherent risks as:
(5) "Inherent risks" with regard to equine or livestock activities
means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine or
livestock activities, which may include:
(a)

the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result
in injury harm or death to persons around them;

(b)

the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside
stimulation such as sound sudden movement, and unfamiliar
objects or persons, or other animals;

(c)

collision with other animals or objects; or

(d)

the potential for the participant to act in a negligent manner
that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such
as failing to maintain control over the animal or not acting
within his or her ability.
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The natural association of ideas, would permit a sponsor from waiving such
inherent risks as are listed and would include other inherent risks such as collisions with
wild animals, tripping on rocks on the trail or being kicked by the horse in front, but it
would not include such polar opposites as the negligence of the sponsor. The inference
of the definitions' list of inherent risks is that the legislature did not intend to include
negligence of the sponsor as an inherent risk of equine activities.
d)

Skiing Act (Similar Statutes in the same Chapter).
Under a whole statute interpretation courts must construe provisions in harmony

with statutes under the same and related chapters. Archuleta, 2010 UT 36, at f8. The
Skiing Act, which is in the same chapter as the Equine Act and which the Equine Act was
intended to parallel, prohibits a ski operator from waiving its negligence in a pre-injury
release. Rothstein 2007 UT 96, f20. The two statutes are parallel in content and similar
in language; both limit a participant's from recovering from inherent risks of the sport.
See U.C.A §§78B-4-202(2) and 78B-4-403. Both acts define inherent risks as those that
are integral to the sport. See U.C.A §§78B-4-201(l) and 78B-4-402(l). Both acts
require that the operator or sponsor post a sign listing inherent risks of the sport to benefit
from their respective Acts. See U.C.A. §§78B-4-203 and 78B-4-404.
Both acts permit a participant to recover from acts of the sponsor or operator's
negligence: the Equine Act states it explicitly in U.C.A §78B-4-202(2)(d)(i)-(ii); while
the Skiing Act is presumed to permit itfromthe language prohibiting the participant from
recovering from inherent risks. See Rothstein, 2007 UT 96 at % 16. The Skiing Act
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specifically prohibits a participant from recovering for inherent risks the following Public
Policy statement:
The legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number
of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of non-residents,
significantly contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that
few insurance carriers are willing to provide liability insurance protections
to ski area operators and that the premiums charged by those carriers have
risen sharply in recent years due to the confusion as to whether a skier
assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this
act, therefore, to clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the
risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of public policy, no
person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator for
injuries resulting from those inherent risks.
U.C.A. 78B-4-401(2007)
The Equine Act does not provide the prohibition in a public policy statement;
rather it is contained in the text of the statute, which states:
An equine activity sponsor . . . . is not liable for an injury to or the
death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these
activities, unless the sponsor or professional: . . . (d)(i) commits an act or
omission that constitutes negligence, . . and that act or omission causes the
injury.
U.C.A 78B-4-202(2) (See full text of the Liability Section 202 supra). (The bold
highlight in the skiing act and the equine act was added to demonstrate the similar
language in the two statutes; the italicized area shows additional language found
only within the Equine Act).
In Rothstein, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that the public policy statement
above created a bargain between the insurance companies and skiing operators. Rothstein
2007 UT 96, f 16. The Rothstein Court found that the legislature delineated risks that are
inherent in the sport where liability would not adhere, from those dangers created by the
operator's negligence (non-inherent risks) where liability would adhere. Id. When
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Snowbird extracted a pre-injury release from the participant for its negligent acts,
Snowbird breached the bargain between it and the participant. Id.
The Equine Act also delineated the risks between an operator and the participant.
U.C.A 78B-4-202. The difference between the two statutes is that the Supreme Court of
Utah in Rothstein had to derive from the public policy statement a prohibition on a ski
operators' ability to waive its own negligence in a pre-injury release. Unlike the Skiing
Act, in the Equine Act above the legislature just straight out stated an equine activity
sponsor is not liable for inherent risks unless he "commits an act or omission of
negligence." U.C.A. §78B-4-202(2).
Therefore, if the Equine Act (with its expression that an equine activity sponsor be
held responsible for its own negligence) is to be in harmony with the Skiing Act (with its
derived prohibition from the public policy), the Equine Act must be determined to also
prohibit an equine activity sponsor from waiving its own negligence in a pre-injury
release.
The plain language of the Equine Act, using each of the above canons of statutory
construction, demonstrates that the legislature intended to create a bargain between
equine sponsors and participants. The bargain was the same in the skiing act, to ensure
that the equine sponsor would not be liable for inherent risks associated with equine
activities while the participant would be able to recover for injuries caused by the
sponsors negligence.
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2)

LEGISLATIVE DEBATES
The Utah 1992 House of Representatives and 2003 Senate floor debates plainly

support the legislative intention that the Equine Act was to provide the exact same
bargain to equine activity sponsors as the Skiing Act provided to ski operators. The
Supreme Court of Utah in Rothstein held:
[b]y expressly designating a ski area operator's ability to acquire insurance
at reasonable rates as the sole reason for bringing the Act into being, the
Legislature authoritatively put to rest the question of whether ski area
operators are at liberty to use preinjury releases to significantly pare back or
even eliminate their need to purchase the very liability insurance the Act
was designed to make affordable. They are not. The premise underlying
legislative action to make insurance accessible to ski area operators is that
once the Act made liability insurance affordable, ski areas would buy it to
blunt the economic effects brought on by standing accountable for their
negligent acts. The bargain struck by the Act is both simple and obvious
from its public policy provision: ski area operators would be freed from
liability for inherent risks of skiing so that they could continue to shoulder
responsibility for noninherent risks by purchasing insurance. By extracting
a preinjury release from Mr. Rothstein for liability due to their negligent
acts, Snowbird breached this public policy bargain.
Id at «fl6
The legislative debates regarding the Equine Act affirmatively f,put to rest the
question of whether [equine sponsors] are at liberty to use pre-injury releases to
significantly pare back or even eliminate their need to purchase the very liability
insurance the [Equine] Act was designed to make affordable."
The 1992 House of Representatives and the 2003 Senate Floor Debates
unequivocally demonstrate that the Equine Act's purpose, just like in the Skiing Act's
public policy statement, was to provide immunity for inherent risks so that the equine
activity sponsor could shoulder the costs of insuring itself for non-inherent risks. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Equine Act was passed as a parallel bill to the Skiing Act. Also important to the 1992
and 2003 debates were that the equine activity sponsors would not be able to escape
liability for their own negligence, fearing that a sponsor would act negligently.
Specifically, the debates reflected that the intention of the legislature was a bargain
between the sponsors and the insurance industry so that the sponsor would not be liable
for inherent risks associated with equine activities in order to afford insurance for its
negligent acts.
On February 21, 1992, during the General Legislative Session, House Bill
HB0362, (then called the Equine Liability Limitation Act), was debated. House of
Representatives1 Floor Debate, Equine Liability Limitations Act, Hearings on HB0362,
Day 40, p 1, (February 21, 1992) (See Addendum C) The goal articulated by the billfs
sponsor, Rep. David M. Adams, was to provide the same protection that the skiing act
provided to inherent risks without shielding a sponsor for its own negligence. Id at p. 2
lines 10-19. Specifically Rep. Adams stated:
Rep. Adams:

And it [] does not attempt to remove any liability for negligence, but
attending a horse event, whether it be a race, a show, a rodeo, or
what ever, it has with it inherent liability, much the same as when
you go skiing.

Id at p. 2 lines 10-19.
Representative Adams responded to Representative Browns concerns about the
purpose of the bill, stating that the insurance industry had input into the bill so that equine
sponsors could obtain insurance at affordable rates. Specifically Adams affirmed:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
21 may contain errors.

Rep. Adams:

[The] language was adopted [] with the hopes and the input from the
insurance industry that if you do this [the sponsor] can buy
insurance at a little cheaper rate.
Realizing, on the same basis that IVe explained before, when you get
around horses, you are [] exposing yourself to some risk, much the
same as when you come down a ski slope.
When you go [skiing] youVe got to know that there's a chance that
you can fall down and break your leg.
If you walk behind a horse, there is a chance you're going to get
kicked.
And it will limit the liability of the sponsor of that event, because of
these inherent risks of attending those kinds of events.
itfatpp. 7-8 lines 14-25, 1-2.

Rep Adams in response to Rep. Brown's inquiries stated that the bill was not
intended to limit sponsor's exposures for their own negligence. Specifically affirming
that:
Rep. Adams:

But if [the sponsors] do anything in the way of negligence if [] they
bring a wild horse in there knowing that [] I do not think that limits
their exposure.
If they provide faulty equipment, it does not limit their exposure.
I think those limitations were put in [the act]. (They were). It's not
an attempt to [] insulate these [sponsors] from negligent acts, just an
attempt to recognize that a horse is not totally manageable. That a
horse is not a pet. That a horse is [] not as loveable as it sometimes
appears.

Id at pp. 8-9, Lines 20-25, and 1-7.
On February 11, 2003 during the general session, Senator Beverly Evans
sponsored Senate Bill SB0123 an Amended Substitute to the Equine Liability Act to add
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Inherent Risks of Livestock Activities. Senate Floor Debate, Inherent Risks ofLivestock
Activities Act, Hearings on SB0123, Day 23, p.l Addendum D, (February 11, 2003)
Sen. Hillyard was fearful that the Equine Act would recreate "contributory
negligence" and that the bill would make it so a sponsor who was found 99% negligent
would not be responsible for the participant who was only 1% negligent. Id at p. 5, Lines
1-5. Sen. Valentine was worried that the bill would "encourage [equine sponsors] to be
negligent." Id at p. 6, Lines 15-17. Sen. Hillyard further feared that the equine sponsors
would not purchase insurance if they were immune from suit. Id at p. 7 Lines 1-2. Id.
In addition Sen. Hillyard not only feared that a participant would be injured and unable to
recover, but a sponsor would be exposed if the Supreme Court of Utah were to ever strike
the bill down. Id at 7, lines 2-6. Although, Sen. Hillyard misinterpreted the statute as
recreating contributory negligence, his fears of a participant getting injured by the
sponsor's negligence and being unable to recover, would be realized if the act permitted a
sponsor to waive his liability for his negligence in a pre-injury release.
On the second day of hearing the bill, Senator Valentine sponsored an additional
amendment that required the equine activity sponsor to post signs for inherent risks. See
Senate Floor Debate, Inherent Risks of Livestock Activities Act, Hearings on SB0123,
Day 25, p. 2-3, Lines 19-25, 1-8. (February 13, 2003). Senator Valentine's and Senator
Evan's purpose for this amendment was to ensure that the Equine Act would "parallel"
the Skiing Act. Id. Defending his amendment Sen. Valentine explained;
Sen. Valentine:

After reviewing the bill, I feel that the bill does do what
Senator Evans wants [it] to do. I think it's a fair compromise;
however, to be running parallel, so that the system does the
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same as which she indicated when she had her debate, [but] to
run parallel to the same as the ski industry, there need[ed] to
be the warning sign[s] given, just as in the ski industry.
So when you have the stockyards set up, and you have the
livestock being used, it has to give the same kind of warning
of inherent risk. That's all the amendment does.
Id at pp. 2-3, Lines 19-25, 1-8.
Senator Valentine's comments confirms two things: First, that the Equine Act was
intended to parallel the Skiing Act, affording participants of each activity the same rights;
and second, that the Notice Section 203 was created to solely provide notice to the
participant of inherent dangers.
During the multiple debates between 1992 and 2003, it is apparent that the equine
industry along with the insurance industry were striking a bargain so that equine activity
sponsors could limit their liability only to non-inherent risks and to obtain insurance for
those non-inherent risks. It is also apparent that the senators were concerned that the
statute would inadvertently allow an equine activity sponsor the ability to have complete
immunity for its negligence and therefore drafted the Act to prevent this from occurring.
The legislative debates altogether support Ms. Penunurifs plain language argument that
the legislature intended that an equine sponsor cannot avoid its liability for its negligence
in a pre-injury release. Therefore when Sundance extracted a mandatory release from Ms.
Penunuri, Sundance breached its legislative created bargain between it and Ms. Penunuri.
He *

*
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Penunuri and Barry Siegwart, respectfully request
that this Supreme Court of Utah find in their favor, overturn Utah Court of Appeals
opinion 2011 UT App. and allow them to pursue their negligence claims against
Sundance et al.
Respectfully submitted this 17

day of January 2012.
STRIEPER LAW FIRM

ERTOT STRIEPER
ROBERTO.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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A/estlaw.
J.CA. 1953§78B-4-201
brmerly cited as UT ST § 78-27b-101

Zest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
\
»^g Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability
ngPart 2. Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities
«> «• § 78B-4-201. Definitions

s used in this part:

) "Equine" means any member of the equidae family.

\) "Equine activity" means:

(a) equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances, racing, sales, or parades that involve any breeds of equines and any equine
disciplines, including dressage, hunter and jumper horse shows, grand prix jumping, multiple-day events, combined training, rodeos,
driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeple chasing, hunting, endurance trail riding, and western games;

(b) boarding or training equines;

(c) teaching persons equestrian skills;

(d) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine owned by another person regardless of whether the owner receives monetary or other
valuable consideration;

'e) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine by a prospective purchaser; or

f) other equine activities of any type including rides, trips, hunts, or informal or spontaneous activities sponsored by an equine
tctivity sponsor.
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««,.*«.«., &IV7MF, guvwiunuiiai ^mny, v^iuu, parmersnip, or corporation, wnetfter operating for
)fit or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for an equine activity, including:

a) pony clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs, 4-H programs, therapeutic riding programs, and public and private schools and
>ostsecondary educational institutions that sponsor equine activities; and

b) operators, instructors, and promoters of equine facilities, stables, clubhouses, ponyride strings, fairs, and arenas.

"Equine professional" means a person compensated for an equine activity by:

a) instructing a participant;

b) renting to a participant an equine to ride, drive, or be a passenger upon the equine; or

c) renting equine equipment or tack to a participant.

"Inherent risk" with regard to equine or livestock activities means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine
ivestock activities, which may include:

a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them;

b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects,,
ersons, or other animals;

z) collisions with other animals or objects; or

i) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing
•) maintain control over the animal or not acting within his or her ability.

"Livestock" means all domesticated animals used in the production of food, fiber, or livestock activities.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(a) livestock shows, fairs, competitions, performances, packing events, or parades or rodeos that involve any or all breeds of
livestock;

(b) using livestock to pull carts or to carry packs or other items;

(c) using livestock to pull travois-type carriers during rescue or emergency situations;

(d) livestock training or teaching activities or both;

(e) taking livestock on public relations trips or visits to schools or nursing homes;

(f) boarding livestock;

(g) riding, inspecting, or evaluating any livestock belonging to another, whether or not the owner has received some monetary
consideration or other thing of value for the use of the livestock or is permitting a prospective purchaser of the livestock to ride,
inspect, or evaluate the livestock;

(h) using livestock in wool production;

(i) rides, trips, or other livestock activities of any type however informal or impromptu that are sponsored by a livestock activity
sponsor; and

(j) trimming the feet of any livestock.

I "Livestock activity sponsor" means an individual, group, governmental entity, club, partnership, or corporation, whether operating
* profit or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for a livestock activity, including:

a) livestock clubs, 4-H programs, therapeutic riding programs, and public and private schools and postsecondary educational
nstitutions that sponsor livestock activities; and
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b) operators, instructors, and promoters of livestock facilities, stables, clubhouses, fairs, and arenas.

"Livestock professional" means a person compensated for a livestock activity by:

a) instructing a participant;

b) renting to a participant any livestock for the purpose of riding, driving, or being a passenger upon the livestock; or

c) renting livestock equipment or tack to a participant.

) "Participant" means any person, whether amateur or professional, who directly engages in an equine activity or livestock activity,
ardless of whether a fee has been paid to participate.

)(a) "Person engaged in an equine or livestock activity" means a person who rides, trains, leads, drives, or works with an equine or
;stock, respectively.

b) Subsection (11 )(a) does not include a spectator at an equine or livestock activity or a participant at an equine or livestock activity
yho does not ride, train, lead, or drive an equine or any livestock.

EDIT(S)

rent through 2011 Third Special Session.

2011 Thomson Reuters

D OF DOCUMENT
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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/VestlawL
J.C.A. 1953 § 78B-4-202
'ormerly cited as UT ST § 78-27b-102

best's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
m Ch a P ler 4. Limitations on Liability
*gPart 2. Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities
«• ^ § 78B-4-202. Equine and livestock activity liability limitations

[) It shall be presumed that participants in equine or livestock activities are aware of and understand that there are inherent risks
>sociated with these activities.

1) An equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable for an injury to or
e death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities, unless the sponsor or professional:

(a)(i) provided the equipment or tack;

(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; and

(iii) the equipment failure was due to the sponsor's or professional's negligence;

(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the
activity with the participant;

(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in legal possession and control of land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because
of a dangerous condition which was known to or should have been known to the sponsor or professional and for which warning
signs have not been conspicuously posted;

d)(i) commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence, gross negligence, or willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the
participant; and
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e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to the participant.

This chapter does not prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, a livestock activity
>nsor, or a livestock professional who is:

a) a veterinarian licensed under Title 58, Chapter 28, Veterinary Practice Act, in an action to recover for damages incurred in the
:ourse of providing professional treatment of an equine;

b) liable under Title 4, Chapter 25, Estrays and Trespassing Animals; or

c) liable under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Utah Product Liability Act.

EDIT(S)

Tent through 2011 Third Special Session.

2011 Thomson Reuters
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A/estlavu
LC.A. 1953 § 78B-4-203
ormerly cited as UT ST § 78-27b-103

Zest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
^Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability
fygPart 2. Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities
^ ^ § 78B-4-203. Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability limitations

) An equine or livestock activity sponsor shall provide notice to participants of the equine or livestock activity that there are inherent
sks of participating and that the sponsor is not liable for certain of those risks.

) Notice shall be provided by:

(a) posting a sign in a prominent location within the area being used for the activity; or

(b) providing a document or release for the participant, or the participant's legal guardian if the participant is a minor, to sign.

) The notice provided by the sign or document shall be sufficient if it includes the definition of inherent risk in Section 78B-4-201
d states that the sponsor is not liable for those inherent risks.

Notwithstanding Subsection (1), signs are not required to be posted for parades and activities that fall within Subsections 78B-4l(2)(f)and(7)(c),(e),(g),(h),anda).
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f.CA. 1953 § 78B-4-401
ormerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-51

Zest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
* j Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability
*g Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing
. * . • § 78B-4-401. Public policy

he Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of
presidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide
ability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in recent years
je to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, 1 FN 11 therefore, to
arify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are
herent in that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator
•r injuries resulting from those inherent risks.

REDIT(S)

IFN11 Laws 1979, c. 166 enacted former §§ 78-27-51 to 78-27-54.

jrrent through 2011 Third Special Session.

) 2011 Thomson Reuters
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:.A. 1953§78B-4-402
•merly cited as UT ST § 78-27-52

jst's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
ritle78B. Judicial Code
*U Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability
i^g Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing
„+_> § 78B-4-402. Definitions

used in this part IFNil:

"Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of recreational, competitive, or
Sessional skiing, including, but not limited to:

a) changing weather conditions;

b) snow or ice conditions as they exist or may change, such as hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush,
;ut-up snow, or machine-made snow;

c) surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, trees, and other natural
)bjects;

d) variations or steepness in terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, and other
errain modifications such as terrain parks, and terrain features such as jumps, rails, fun boxes, and all other constructed and natural
Matures such as half pipes, quarter pipes, or freestyle-bump terrain;

e) impact with lift towers and other structures and their components such as signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, or water
}ipes;

f) collisions with other skiers;
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(h) the failure of a skier to ski within the skier's own ability.

) "Injury" means any personal injury or property damage or loss.

) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other types of
i jumping, using skis, sled, tube, snowboard, or any other device.

) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area operator to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other type of ski jumping,
id snowboarding.

) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their agents, officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area.
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est's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
i^l Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability
^m Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing
^^ § 78B-4-403. Bar against claim or recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in sport

^withstanding anything in Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823 to the contrary, no skier may make any claim against, or recover
>m, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.
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est's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*ig Chapter 4. Limitations on Liability
* B Part 4. Inherent Risks of Skiing
^ ^ § 78B-4-404. Trail boards listing inherent risks and limitations on liability

:i area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations within each ski area which shall include a list of the
herent risks of skiing, and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this part.
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P R O C E E D I N G S
SPEAKER:

Madam Reading Clerk.

READING CLERK:

House Bill No. 362.

Equine

Liability Limitation Advocacy; Representative Adams.
SPEAKER:

Representative Adams?

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

This is a companion

bill to the bill we discussed yesterday, about limiting
liability for participants in an equine event.
SPEAKER:

Uh-huh.

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

And it —

it -- it

does not attempt to remove any liability for
negligence, but attending a horse event, whether it be
a race, a show, a rodeo, or whatever, it has with it
inherent liability, much the same as when you go
skiing.
And in this, we put in statutes that —

that

does limit the liability of sponsors, whether they be
profit or non-profit corporations, sponsoring those
equine events.
We'll yield the question, if there are any?
SPEAKER:

Representative Lyles?

REPRESENTATIVE LYLES:

Thank you.

Question

of the sponsor.
SPEAKER:

Will the sponsor yield?

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

Yes.
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REPRESENTATIVE LYLES:

Representative Adams,

has this had a committee hearing?
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

This bill did not

have a committee hearing.
REPRESENTATIVE LYLES:

Does it have a fiscal

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

This bill —

note?

it does have a fiscal note.

Ifm sure

And it's -- there's no

fiscal impact to the state.
SPEAKER:

Representative Stephens.

REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS:

Just a couple of

quick questions.
On page three, Representative Adams, where
you're talking about the liability limitations
themselves.

This has come up rather quick, and so I

haven't had a chance to read through this, but -An equine activity sponsor/equine
professional is not liable for an injury to or the
death of participant engaged in the activity unless the
sponsor -I guess the one I'm concerned about is b(i)
and b(ii).

Unless the respon —

so they would be

responsible if they've provided the horse and failed to
make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine
whether the -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

This is the part that I was reading, and I
was -- wasn't sure what this means exactly.
If they provide the horse, then they have
to -- and they fail to make reasonable and prudent
efforts to determine whether the participant could
engage safely in the horse activity -- or equine
activity, what kind of steps is this requiring them to
do to see if the participant -Would this mean like they'd have to be a -like a licensed rodeo or something?

Or -- how --

what -- what steps could they do to make sure that this
person -- how are they going to know if this person can
reasonably engage in those types of activities?

And

then under B, the horse, the equine -- doesn't equine
mean horse?
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

The purpose of the

Act, much like the ski -- is done in the ski industry,
it simply says if you behave -- if you go the -- to
these activities, you have to recognize that there's a
chance you can be hurt; but at the same time, it

—

we're not intending to let the sponsors of those
activities -- for example, if you're going to a dude
ranch to ride a horse, this does not limit the
liability of the owner of that dude ranch to pro -- if
he provides you with a wild bucking horse, knowing that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1

you cannot handle it, that does not remove the

2

liability from that -- that particular person, but --

3

REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS:

Well, I guess

4

that -- that's my point.

5

particular person can handle a wild bucking horse?

6

—

How do they know if a

Say it's a rodeo, and you have a rider

7

that's going to ride these broncos, and the bronco

8

throws him and he's injured.

9

still be liable or they wouldn't be liable?

10

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

They would -- they would

Well, in the example

11

you're putting to me, the entrant has to pay a fee, and

12

he absolutely knows what he's doing, and he's

13

participating in a —

14

risk.

15

there.

16

there that -- that he knows what's happening and,

17

therefore, if he does get injured, knowing the type of

18

activity, he's a member of the Professional Rodeo

19

Cowboy's Association, I'm just speculating that yes,

20

this would limit the liability of the rodeo people.

in the event, acknowledging the

And when he does that, I —

I think it's implied

I'm not an attorney, but I think it's implied

21

REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS:

Look at line 22.

22

Unless the sponsor -- reading -- so the

23 I

sentence makes sense, "Unless the sponsor or

24

professional fail to make reasonable and prudent

25 I

efforts to determine whether the equine could behave
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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safely with the participant.
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

I —

I'm not —

in

this piece of legislation, we're not trying -- there
are a lot of people that rent horses out to dudes on a
one-, or a two-, or a three-hour basis.

And on this

legislation, I'm not attempting to limit their
liability if they bring in a -- an unmanageable horse
for an inexperienced rider; but at the same time, if
you go to a rodeo, you expect an unmanageable horse.
REPRESENTATIVE STEPHENS:
you're saying.

Okay.

SPEAKER:

Okay.

I see what

Thank you.
Representative Brown.

REPRESENTATIVE BROWN:

Thank you,

Mr. Speaker.
Will the sponsor yield to a question?
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:
SPEAKER:

Yes.

Will the sponsor yield?

Proceed.
REPRESENTATIVE BROWN:

Tell me how this

could impact the liability at a horse pulling contest?
Now I notice, in the definition of equine
activities that it's listed, but under this particular
issue that Representative Stevenson just brought up -Stephens just brought up, it indicates that -- that
fail to make reasonable and prudent efforts to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1J

determine whether the equine could behave safely with

2

the participant.

3

A lot of times a person, you know, in -- in those

4

contests, an animal gets excited.

5

Now, I don't quite understand that.

A couple of years ago, out in Draper, for

6

example, we had a horse get over a fence, go right over

7

a fence and land in the lap of some people.

8

exempting us from liability, or increasing our

9

liability?

10

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

Is this

I don't know.

The

11

only thing I can tell you is this language was adopted

12

from the states of Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and two or

13

three other states who have enacted this very

14

legislation, and it was done with the hopes and the

15

input of the insurance industry, that if you do this,

16

you can buy insurance at a little cheaper rate.

17

Realizing, on the same basis that I've

18

explained before, when you get around horses, you

19

are -- you are exposing yourself to some risk, much the

20

same as when you come down a ski slope.

21

there, you've got to know that there's a chance that

22 J

you can fall down and break your leg.

23
24
25

When you go in

If you walk behind a horse, there's a chance
you're going to get kicked.
And it will limit the liability of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sponsor of that event, because of these inherent risks
of attending those kind of events.
REPRESENTATIVE BROWN:

Would this -- would

this have any impact on the activity we see downtown,
with the carriages, at all?

Could this be a benefit

to them in dealing with that liability issue?
I think the thing to do -- you're trying to
do is good.

I'm surely not speaking against it,

because this has been a big issue.

In fact, the

association, the Horse Pulling Association, usually has
their own liability insurance, as do most of the
counties or cities where you go to put on a contest.
And I hope this would have the effect you're
talking about, limit the liability so that this
insurance could be purchased cheaper.
The activity, the commercial activity, does
it affect that at all, do you know?
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

I —

I -- I'm sorry,

I can't answer -- I don't know.
But -- if they do anything in the way of
negligence, if -- if they bring a wild horse in there
knowing that —

I don't -- I do not think that limits

their exposure.
If they provide faulty equipment, it does
not limit their exposure.
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1

I -- I think those limitations were put in

2

there.

It's not —

3

to —

4

just an attempt to recognize that a horse is not

5

totally manageable.

6

horse is -- is -- is not as lovable as it sometimes

7

appears.

it's not an attempt

to insulate these people from negligent acts,

8
9

and it's —

That a horse is not a pet.

REPRESENTATIVE BROWN:

That a

And the public should

recognize that.

10

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

Yes.

11

REPRESENTATIVE BROWN:

Of course I -- I

12

guess the issue of the equipment is certainly up to

13

interpretation by a judge.

14

You know, I know of a case -- and of course

15

I'm talking strictly from the point of the view of the

16

draft horses now, but I've seen a couple of cases at

17

pulling matches where these horses get excited, and you

18

pull them in with a stone rope to hook up, and a snap

19

on the line has broken.

20

If you've been to one, there's sometimes

21

three or four people hanging on the lines to hold the

22 J

horses.

23

Down at the state fair, for example, last

24 J

September, I was assisting a friend of mine with a

25 I

team.

And he had good lines, but his horses were
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excited, and they were going into the boat, and with he
and I both dragging on the lines, one of the lines
snapped.

And the minute that snapped, that pressure,

of course that changed the direction of the horses, and
we starte d off through the crowds.
Fortunately, we got them shut down.

1

And that was even a bigger risk, recognizing

1

the kind of conditions at the fair grounds because of
all of th e rain, we were pulling in an area where the
crowd was very accessible there.

I

And I -- I guess I just have had those
questions

And I think the intent is very good.

J
I

J

think it' s something we might have to look at and could

I

amend or change if there's problems, but I certainly

1

support i t.
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:
SPEAKER:

thank you.

Representative Rise.

REPRESENTATIVE RISE:

Thank you.

Sponsor yield?
SPEAKER:

Will the sponsor yield?

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:
SPEAKER:

yes.

Proceed.

REPRESENTATIVE RISE:

Representative Adams,

I too support what we're trying to do, and trying to
1

clarify in my mind, what -- what is meant by limited
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1

liability?

2

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

3

REPRESENTATIVE RISE:

Come again?
What is meant by

4

limited liability?

Is there a figure?

5

does that mean there's no liability?

6

figures, or --

7

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

8

REPRESENTATIVE RISE:

9
10

Or number?

Or

What -- I see no

Well, it —

I

Whatfs the definition

of that, I guess.
REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

I believe that's

11

defined on page three, lines 12 through 13, where it

12

says the "Is not liable for injury or death of a

13

participant in the event -- unless he is guilty in

14

in the -- in those lines listed below that.

15

REPRESENTATIVE RISE:

16 I
17

—

In other words,

limited would be there would be no liability.
In other words, there's not a certain point.

18

In other words, limited, if it -- if it wasn't

19

intentional, or it wasn't your fault, then virtually

20

there would be no liability is what you're saying.

21

REPRESENTATIVE ADAMS:

22

REPRESENTATIVE RISE:

23

SPEAKER:

24

REPRESENTATIVE TUTTLE:

25

That's correct.
Okay.

Thank you.

Representative Tuttle.
Thank you,

Mr. Speaker.
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You know, every year out in Magna, we have a
rodeo.

And everybody knows when they to go rodeos with

people that are riding in the rodeo, if they get hurt,
they're not going to sue anybody.
Sometimes you might worry about somebody in
the stands that gets too close and gets kicked or
something like that, but I think people understand that
when you're around livestock and horses, sometimes they
do kick.
I think this is more of a human sense bill
here, that we've got to have some common sense.

And I

think this just takes the responsibility off the
sponsors, for somebody being stupid.
(Whereupon, the recording
was concluded.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
SPEAKER:

Now go to First Substitute Senate

Bill 123.
READING CLERK:

Senate Bill 123, Inherent

Risk of Livestock Activities; Senator Beverly Evans.
SPEAKER:

Senator Evans.

SENATOR EVANS:

Thank you, Mr. President.

I need to move some amendments that are just
clerical, if I could do that.
SPEAKER:

Okay.

SENATOR EVANS:

On line —

or page four,

line 115 reinstate the double i and delete three.
And then on page four, line 116, delete E
and insert D.
And on page four line 117, delete two and
insert three.
If I could hand that to the cercla.

It's

just an editing error.
SPEAKER:

Okay.

SENATOR EVANS:
that

Okay?

So I need to move

~
SPEAKER:

Do you have those, Sandy?

Okay, very good.
I'll place those amendments.

All in favor

of those amendments, say aye.
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1

(AYES HEARD.)

2

SPEAKER:

3I

Motion passes.

4

Now to the bill.

5

SENATOR EVANS:

6

Several years ago, when we were talking

Opposed?

Thank you, Mr. President.

7

about equine events, we wanted to try and limit the

8

liabilities, and we overlooked including the livestock

9

activities.

And this allows us, so we don't have

10

extreme liabilities for young people who choose to

11

participate in livestock shows, or people who choose

12

to -- to participate in professional livestock

13

activities, it includes a definition of livestock.

14

So it just puts a limitation so that we can

15

continue these type of activities without always being

16

at risk of liability.

17

SPEAKER:

18

We go to Senator Allen first, then to

19

Okay.

Senator Hillyard.

20

SENATOR ALLEN:

Thank you, Mr. President.

21

Some of these programs are very active in my

22

senate district, and I know that we have a lot of

23

injuries.

24 1

almost weekly.

25 I

In fact, in one area we have something

But is this going to limit their access to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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recover healthcare costs, any of those issues?
What kind of caps are going to be on those?
SENATOR EVANS:

No.

It doesn't.

It just

goes back -- you know when you go back and have these
extreme losses, it puts a limitation so that you don't
end up with, you know, hundreds and thousands of
dollars.

And it puts just a (inaudible) limitation on

those.
SENATOR ALLEN:

It --

SENATOR EVANS:

—

costs or any injury costs.
SENATOR ALLEN:

recovered healthcare

Or property damage.
And if I may ask another

question of the sponsor.
What is that limit?

I didn't find it

quickly looking through that bill.
SENATOR EVANS:
the code.

It's in another section of

We just -SENATOR ALLEN:

Is the $400,000 malpractice

SENATOR EVANS:

No.

SENATOR ALLEN:

That's the question I have.

on it?

I'll have to try to find it here.
SENATOR HILLYARD:

Thank you.

I guess my concern with

the bill is -- is there was a recent Utah Supreme Court
case that struck down the releases that many people
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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used for activities.

And as I read the bill, it really

appears to me that we're recreating a thing that used
to be called contributory negligence, which, if you are
one percent at fault and the other was 99 percent at
fault, you would recover nothing.
We changed that a number of years to
comparative negligence, so that if you're 40 percent at
fault and the other person is 60 percent at fault, and
your damages were say $10,000, you'd get 60 percent of
it.
If it were equal, 50/50, you'd recover
nothing.

And it became a more fair system.
And I guess I'm concerned, as I read this,

because I don't read an exemption for gross negligence.
For people who may be running a fair and know they've
got a dangerous animal there, and -- and don't really
particularly be worried about it because they have no
liability.
And I think what we've done on most of these
is if we have granted some type of limited immunity,
we've made it limited immunity, but also excluded out
of it gross negligence in that regard.
And I think, in answer to Senator Allen's
question, there would be no recovery at all.
Now, I can understand, if I'm out working in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a 4H thing, and dealing with animals all the time, that
I should be expected to know more about that.

But if

I'm somebody who just came in from the country, and -or from the city, and went to ride a horse or go to a
fair or something, and really had never been around
animals my whole life, and something happened and maybe
I am at fault.

Maybe I'm 20 percent at fault.

But if

people looking at it realistically said, you know, the
people who put this together were probably 80 percent
at fault of this.

They had an animal there they knew

was dangerous, and they didn't take proper care of it,
but yet what we've done in this bill is the person
who's 20 percent at fault would get nothing because we
presume that everyone knows how to handle animals and
do animals.

And the argument really is is that it

encourages us to be negligent.

It encourages us to not

worry about taking care.
I would be more comfortable if the bill were
structured more like -- you know, if there's gross
negligence and a different standard, then this type of
a -- of a (inaudible).
So I have problems with this bill, and I'll
have to probably vote no, even though I —

you know, I

agree with Senator Allen, I have a lot of people that
would probably like it, but as a practical matter, I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hate to pass it, people then think, Ahh, I'm safe.
don't have to worry about insurance.

I

Being struck down

by the Supreme Court, as some of these statutes we've
done, then suddenly they're exposed with no insurance
coverage at all.

And I think that's not fair to the

people either.
SPEAKER:

Thank you.

Senator -- do you want to reply to that,
Senator Evans?

Or do you want to just go on with other

question?
SENATOR EVANS:

Yes, (inaudible).

If you'll

read through the definition that we have here in this
bill, we had defined very specifically the type of
activities, and so many of the examples that Senator
Hillyard used would not be applicable to here.
It has livestock shows, competition,
performances, pack event, or parades that are involved
pulling carts.

Teaching activities.

Public relations.

It has a rides, trips, and other livestocks
attributing a fee.

4H activities and those types of

things are well defined within there what has the
limitations of liability.
SPEAKER:

Senator Gladwell?

SENATOR GLADWELL:

Thank you, Mr. President.

I did have a question of the sponsor, if I might.
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I just wondered, and I may have missed your
original presentation.

Is there a -- is there a

problem currently, or are you anticipating problems?
I mean, have there been a rash of lawsuits,
or is there a specific case or cases that point to
concerns?

Or is this kind of an anticipatory

legislation?
SENATOR EVANS:

Thank you, Senator.

What we're finding, more and more, because
of the liability environment in which we are
participating in, that many people do not want to allow
any type of use of the livestock or anything because
their so afraid of any type of liability when we have
these livestock shows and different activities, or a
kids even sponsored livestock shows and those type of
things.

People are so concerned because of the

liability, even though they own the animal and most of
them recognize they're inherent risks when they deal
with that livestock.

So yes, we are starting to have a

lot of challenges and problems.
SENATOR GLADWELL:

Well, I wondered, is that

a general concern people are expressing?
worried or concerned?
lawsuits?

They're

Or is there -- have there been

I'm just wondering, trying to separate

reality from potential or probability.
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1

SENATOR EVANS:

Who brought this bill to me

2

were the people in charge of a livestock show out in my

3

senate district, and said we're getting to the point

4

where people don't even want to participate in any of

5

these type of activities, and we need a clearer

6

definition that we recognize there are inherent risks,

7

and we try to have a limited liability.

8

SENATOR GLADWELL:

9

really point to any actual --

10

SENATOR EVANS:

11

SENATOR GLADWELL:

12 I

So there's no -- we can't

Right.
-- recent lawsuit or

anything?

13

SENATOR EVANS:

There has not been a recent

14

lawsuit.

It's just the fear factor out there, more

15

than anything.

16

lack -- or for the horse industry, the equine, and we

17

felt like if we included this for livestock it would be

18

more encompassing.

And it's one we have done for the

19

SPEAKER:

20

SENATOR VALENTINE:

21

Senator Valentine?
Thank you,

Mr. President.

22

I have some concerns with this bill as well.

23

If I read it correctly, on line 61, if a

24

person uses an animal that they know is an aggressive

25 J

or is not suitable for pulling a cart in a 24th of July
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parade, and that animal gets away from them, and gets
onto the parade route and injures people, that person
is immune from any liability.

There's no cap.

There's

no $400,000 cap like there is in the state law.
There's no cap.

It just —

he's immune.

If, in fact, that's the case, and I find it
throughout the bill and various different places like
that, that gives me some real cause for concern.
In fact, if I could, Mr. President, ask the
sponsor a question.
Is that what you intend in this, Senator?
SENATOR EVANS:

No, it isn't.

You know, Mr. President, I think at this
time I'd like to circle the bill, and then I'd be able
to answer a lot of those questions off the floor,
because it's about that time.
SPEAKER:

Why don't we do that.

SENATOR VALENTINE:

Yeah.

Mr. President, I'd like

to move to circle.
SPEAKER:

Thank you.

All in favor say aye.

(AYES HEARD.)
SPEAKER:

Opposed?

The motion passes.

I think we're at that --

(Whereupon, the recording
was concluded.)
*

*

*
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

SPEAKER:

3

SENATOR EVANS:

4

Senator Evans?
Mr. President, I'd like to

remove the circle on First Substitute Senate Bill 123.

5

SPEAKER:

61

All in favor say aye.

7

(AYES HEARD.)

8

SPEAKER:

9

Motion to remove circle on 123.

Motion passes.

The bill is before

us.

10

SENATOR EVANS:

Thank you, Mr. President.

11

This was the Inherent Risk of Livestock

12

Activities that we had a chat -- or we started

13

discussing yesterday.

14

consensus, and so I'd like to move to Senator Valentine

15

to make an amendment.

And I think we're all in a

16

SPEAKER:

17

SENATOR VALENTINE:

18
19

Senator Valentine?

Thank you.

Thank you,

Mr. President.
I'd move the amendment, Amendment No. 2,

20

under my name, dated February 13th, 2003.

21

Let me explain that amendment.

22

After reviewing the bill, I feel that the

23

bill does do what Senator Evans wants to do.

24

it' s a fair compromise; however, to be running

25 I

parallel, so that the system does the same as which she
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2

indicated when she had her debate, to run parallel to
the same as the ski industry, there meeds to be the
warning sign given, just as there is in the ski
industry.
So when you have the stockyards set up, and
you have the livestock being used, it has to give the
same kind of warning of inherent risk.

That's all the

amendment does.
SPEAKER:

-- any questions on the amendment?

Seeing none, I'll place the motion.
All in favor of the amendment say aye.
(AYES HEARD.)
Opposed say no.
The motion passes.
The bill is before us as amended, Senator.
SENATOR EVANS:

Thank you, Mr. President.

Yesterday we had an interesting discussion.
People wanted to talk about the limitations of
liability on equine activities, and we've added
livestock activities.
We already had this whole section —

or we

had a section that defined this in the Code, but when
we went back it was not really clear to include 4H and
a lot of different other activities so that -We can't always predict animal behavior, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

that -- if you, for example, have a youngster who's

2

trimming a calf to get him ready for the livestock

3

show, he happens to kick, we can't predict that type of

4

behavior.

51

anything that is gross negligence, the issues of

6

equipment or everything, none of that is exempt.

7

So it just limits the liability.

And there was a question on that yesterday,

8

and we just want to clarify that.

91

to be able to clarify that yesterday.

10
11

SPEAKER:

Thank you.

There was not time

Any question of

Senator Evans?

12

Seeing none, Senator?

13

SENATOR EVANS:

14

on -- for Substitute Senate Bill 123.

15
16 1

But

SPEAKER:

I would call for a question

That will be read for the third

time roll call vote.

17

READING CLERK:

18

(AYE.)

19

READING CLERK:

20

(AYE.)

21

READING CLERK:

22

(AYE.)

23

READING CLERK:

24

(AYE.)

25

READING CLERK:

Senator Allen?

Aaron?

Bale?

Blackham?

Bramble?
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(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Bethers?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Davis?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Demitrich?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Eastman?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Evans?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Evans?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Grippa?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Hatch?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Hellewell?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Hickman?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Hillyard?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Jenkins?

(AYE.)
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READING CLERK:

Julander?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Knutson?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Maine?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Steele?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Stevenson?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Thomas?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Valentine?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Waddoups?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Walker?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

Wright?

(AYE.)
READING CLERK:

President Minsale?

(AYE.)
SPEAKER:
ed.

First Substitute Senate Bill 123

24 aye votes,

no nay votes, and 5 being

sses to the third reading calendar.
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(Whereupon, the recording
was concluded.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
SPEAKER:

Representative Ure.

REPRESENTATIVE URE:

Mr. Speaker, I would

move that we move from the House calendar to the Senate
calendar.
SPEAKER:

The motion is that we move from

the House calendar to the Senate calendar.
Discussion of the motion?
Seeing none, all in favor say aye.
(AYES HEARD.)
SPEAKER:

Opposed say no?

Motion passes.

We're on the Senate

calendar.
Representative Ure.
SENATOR EVANS:

Mr. Chairman —

or

Mr. Speaker, having voted on the prevailing side, I
would move that we reconsider our actions on Senate
Bill 123, title is Inherent Risk of Livestock
Activities, for the purpose of making an amendment.
SPEAKER:

Was there

—

Representative Ure, therefs -- which -- you
said 123, but there's a substitute.
REPRESENTATIVE URE:

Wasn't there?

It's -- it's First

Substitute.
SPEAKER:

Okay.

So you want --
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REPRESENTATIVE URE:
SPEAKER:

Yes.

The motion is we reconsider our

action on First Substitute Senate Bill 123.
REPRESENTATIVE URE:
SPEAKER:

Correct.

Do you want to speak further to

that?
REPRESENTATIVE URE:
passed out yesterday we —

After the bill was

we read the last lines in

the bill to where it can be interpreted many different
ways; and to make it read cleanly, and thoroughly, we
decided we better make those amendments.

And that's

why we 1 re bringing the bill back is to place those
minutes in and make it read more clearly.
SPEAKER:

Okay.

Further discussion to the

motion to reconsider?
Seeing none, Representative Ure for
summation.
REPRESENTATIVE URE:
SPEAKER:

I would waive that.

Motion is we reconsider our action

on having voted on the prevailing side.
Representative Ure moves that we reconsider action on
First Substitute Senate Bill 123.
Discussion -- those in favor of the motion
say aye.
(AYES HEARD.)
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1

SPEAKER:

2I

Motion passes.

3

The bill is -- bill will be reconsidered and

4I

is before us.

5

Opposed say no.

Representative Ure.

SENATOR EVANS:

Mr. Speaker, I would move

6

the amendment -- is Amendment No 4, but I only want to

7

do Amendment 4.

8I

only Amendment No. 4, which is -- says page five, lines

9

123(C) through 123(F).

10

Everything above I want to delete, but

SPEAKER:

Okay.

The motion is that we amend

111

this bill via Amendment No. 4, under

12

Representative Urefs name.

13 1

There are four items on the amendment, and

14

he is only proposing the fourth item.

15

proposing the first three.

He is not

Is that correct?

16

REPRESENTATIVE URE:

17

SPEAKER:

18

REPRESENTATIVE URE:

Correct.

Do you want to speak to that?
If you want to slip

19

over on to -- to the first substitute, I'll show you

20

exactly why I bring this back.

21

On page -- or on line 123(d), it says

22

Listing the inherent risks -- and we're talking about

23

signs.

24

list 30 different inherited risks, because no one would

25 I

ever read it, and it would be all messed up anyway.

We don't want to put a sign out here and then
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We just wanted to designate a sign saying,
Warning, we have problems, or whatever it might be, but
not list all of the -- all of the different inherent
risks.
And the amendment that I have proposed
straightens that out so it just reads a sign out there.
And that's the justification of bringing it back.
SPEAKER:

Further discussion?

Seeing none, Representative Ure for
summation?
SENATOR EVANS:
SPEAKER:

I waive that, please.

Summation is waived.

The motion is that we amend -- we place the
amendment in Representative Urefs name.

It's Amendment

No. 4, and only item four on the amendment.
Those in favor of the motion say aye.
(AYES HEARD.)
Those opposed say no?
Motion passes.
Those in favor of Chris Vanocur getting a
tie on, raise your hand.
Opposed, say no.
All right.

Thank you.

That passes.

Further discussion to the bill as amended?
Further discussion to the bill as amended?
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ll

MR. VANOKER:

2

SPEAKER:

3I
4
5I

I have none.

Thank you, Representative Ure, for

summation.
REPRESENTATIVE URE:

I was glad that Chris

Vanocur was moved anyway.

61

I would waive summation, please.

7

SPEAKER:

8I

Voting is open on First Substitute Senate

9I
10
11
12 j

Summation is waived.

Bill 123 as amended.
Seeing all present as having voted, voting
will be closed.
(Whereupon, the recording
was concluded.)

13"
•

*

•
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15
16
17
18
19
20
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22
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3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801)532-7080
Facsimile: (801)323-2037
Attorneysfor Defendants Sundance Partners, Ltd.,
Sundance Holding, LLC, Sundance Development Corp.
Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, and Rocky
Outfitters
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY SIEGWART, ;
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD.;
SUNDANCE HOLDING, LLC:
SUNDANCE INSTITUTE, INC.;
ROBERT REDFORD;
REDFORD 1970 TRUST;
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OUTFITTERS, L.C.;
and DOES I-X
Defendants.
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I
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])

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS'
ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE-BASED
CLAIMS

)

Civil No.: 080400019

1

Judge Claudia Laycock

The above-entitled matter came before the Court as regularly scheduled on January
19, 2010, at 10:30 a.m., before the Honorable Claudia Laycock. Robert Strieper of the Strieper
Law Finn appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs. H. Burt Ringwood of Strong & Hanni Law Finn
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appeared on behalf of the Defendants. The Court, having reviewed Plaintiffs* Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum, Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, and having considered the arguments of counsel, and being fully
advised in the premises, does hereby enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On August 1,2007, Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri and two friends went to

Sundance for a guided horse ride.
2.

Prior to the ride, Lisa signed a Release & Indemnity Agreement

(hereinafter "Release"), which reads, in relevant part:
RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - READ CAREFULLY BEFORE
SIGNING
I, the undersigned, and if I am a person under 18 years of age, my parents and I
(hereafter "Rider") understand that horseback riding, sleigh riding or horse
drawn wagons (collectively "Horseback Riding") involve SIGNIFICANT RISK
OF SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR EVEN DEATH.
The risks include NATURAL, MAN-MADE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
AND INHERENT RISKS, including changing weather, mud, rocks, variations in
steepness, terrain, natural and man-made obstacles, equipment failure and the
negligence of others. "Inherent risk" with regard to equine or livestock activities
means those dangers or conditions which are an integral pari of equine or livestock
activities, which may include: (a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that
may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them; (b) the
unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds,
sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals; (c) collisions
with other animals or objects; or (d) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent
manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to
maintain control over the animal or not acting within his or her ability. Sundance
shall have no liability for inherent risks,
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In consideration of participation in the Horseback Riding and use of
SUNDANCE'S facilities, I agree to the following:
1. I expressly agree to assume ail risks of personal injury, falls, accidents,
and/or property damage, including those resulting from any negligence of
Sundance Partners Ltd., Sundance Holding LLC, Sundance Development
Corporation, Sundance Institute, Inc., Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust,
Rocky Mountain Outfitters, L.C., their agents, employees, property owners, and
affiliated companies (herein collectively "SUNDANCE").
2. Release & Indemnity. To the fullest extent allowed by law, I agree to forever
release SUNDANCE from any and all claims for injuries, losses, and damages
resulting in any way from "Horseback Riding" use of Sundance facilities,
SUNDANCE'S negligence. My release includes all claims regarding the design,
maintenance, manufacture, instructions, or conditions of the Horseback Riding area,
course, structures or equipment utilized in the Horseback Riding, express or implied
warranties, product liability and the negligence of SUNDANCE. To the fullest
extent allowed by law, I agree to indemnify and hold SUNDANCE haniiless from all
claims, damages or injuries in any way related to my participation in Horseback
Riding or use of any facilities at SUNDANCE, including breach of this Release, and
will reimburse SUNDANCE'S attorneys' fees and costs, even if SUNDANCE was
negligent.
* * #

7. I HAVE READ, UNDERSTOOD AND VOLUNTARILY SIGNED THIS
RELEASE OF LIABILITY.
Signature of Rider:

I si Lisa Penunuri

Date 8/1/07

(Emphasis original.)
3.

During the ride, Lisa fell from her horse and sustained personal injuries

(hereinafter "the Accident").
4.

Lisa Penunuri was 48 years old at the time of the Accident.

5.

It is undisputed that Lisa signed the Release prior to the horseback ride.

6.

It is also undisputed that Lisa signed the Release voluntarily.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah courts have long recognized the general validity of preinjury

releases. Russ v, Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Cl. App. 1995) ("[generally,
parties . . . may properly bargain against liability from harm caused by their ordinary negligence .

2.

In three recent cases, the Utah Supreme Court has "reaffirmed [Utah's]

position with the majority of states that people may contract away their rights to recover in tort
for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of others." Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation.
179 P.3d 760,765 (Utah 2008); see ajso, Berrv v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 171 P.3d 442 (Utah
2007); Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.. 175 P.3d 560 (Utah 2007).
3.

While Utah subscribes to the majority view upholding the validity of

preinjury releases, exceptions to that rule exist when the release offends public policy.
4.

The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.. 175

P.3d 560 (Utah 2007) and its invalidation of apreinjury release on the grounds of public policy,
as reflected in the Inherent Risks of Skiing Act, does not apply in this case.
5.

Of great significance to the Rothstein court were the legislative findings

and expressions of public policy contained in section 78-27-51.
6.

Unlike the Inherent Risks of Skiing Act, the Equine Act contains no

statement or section declaring Utah's public policy. The Equine Act sets forth no legislative
findings or expressions of public policy, which was precisely what the Rothstein court found so
significant and which formed the basis for its holding.
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7.

Nothing in the plain language of the Equine Act suggests that an equine

activity sponsor may not, by contract, limit their liability for non-inherent risks.
8.

This Court declines Plaintiffs' invitation to stray from the plain language

of the Equine Act and read into the Equine Act restrictions that exist nowhere in the actual text.
9.

The Courtfindsthat the Release signed by Lisa is valid and enforceable as

to all of Plaintiffs' ordinary negligence-based claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that all of
Plaintiffs' claims, except for the claim of gross negligence, fail as a matter of law.
ORDER
1.

The Courtfindsthat because the Release is valid and enforceable,

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2.

Based on the above findings and conclusions, all of Plaintiffs' claims, with

the exception of the claim of gross negligence, are dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
3.

Because Plaintiffs' ordinary negligence-based claims do not overlap

Plaintiffs* claim for gross negligence, the Courtfindsthere is no just reason for delay and directs
entry offinaljudgment in favor on Defendants in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
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DATED thislfo day of _ ^AAJKAAU^

2010.

BY THE COURT:

M\Ai^
11

Honorable Claudia
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Roben D. Strieper
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Appeal and Error 30 €^>934(1)
Court of Appeal s of Utah.
Lisa PENUNURI and Barry Siegvvart, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD.; Sundance Holdings, LLC; Sundance Development Corp.; Robert
Redford; Robert Redford 1970 Trust; and Rocky
Mountain Outfitters, LC, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20100331-CA.
June 9,2011.
Background: Participant in guided horseback ride
brought claims against operator for negligence,
gross negligence, and vicarious liability for guide's
conduct, alleging participant fell from horse when
horse unexpectedly accelerated to catch up with
group. The Fourth District Court, Provo Department, Claudia Lay cock, J., dismissed claims based
on ordinary negligence, based on participant's release and indemnity agreement. Participant appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Voros, J., held that
the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act did not preclude a pre-injury
release of liability for ordinary negligence.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30X VI(G) Presumptions
30k934 Judgment
30k934(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The appellate court reviews a trial court's legal
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Rules CI v.Proc, Rule 56.
[21 Appeal and Error 30 €=^842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The appellate court reviews questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation.
[3| Indemnity 208 €^>30(1)

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
11 ] Appeal and Error 30 €^>863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30.XVT( A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases

208 Indemnity
20811 Contractual Indemnity
208k26 Requisites and Validity of Contracts
208k30 Indemnitee's Own Negligence or
Fault
208k30( 1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
In general, the common law disfavors agreements that indemnify parties against their own negligence because one might be careless of another's
life and limb, if there is no penalty for carelessness.
[41 Contracts 95 €=>114
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95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95k 114 k. Exemption from liability. Most
Cited Cases
Generally, those who are not engaged in public
service may properly bargain against liability for
harm caused by their ordinary negligence in performance of a contractual duty, but such an exemption is always invalid if it applies to harm wilfully
inflicted or caused by gross or wanton negligence.
[5| Contracts 95 € » 1 1 4
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95k 114 k. Exemption from liability. Most
Cited Cases
Generally, people may contract away their
rights to recover in tort for damages caused by the
ordinary negligence of others.
(6] Statutes 361 C^>181(1)
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
36IV 1(A) General Rules of Construction
36 i k 180 Intention of Legislature
361k 181 In General
36Ik 181(1) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases

can be so discerned.
[7] Statutes 361 €^>223.2(.5)
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361V 1(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k223 Construction with Reference to
Other Statutes
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to the
Same Subject Matter in General
36Ik223.2(.5) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
To determine the meaning of the plain language of a statute, the court examines the statute in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters.
[8 j Statutes 361 €^>206
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
36! V 1(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
36Ik206 k. Giving effect to entire statute. Most Cited Cases
Effect must be given, if possible, to every
word, clause, and sentence of a statute, and no
clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if the construction
can be found which will give force to and preserve
all the words of the statute.
[91 Animals 28 € ^ 6 6 . 7

Statutes 361 €^>188
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361 k 188 k. In general. Most Ci ted
Cases
To interpret a statute, the court always looks
first to the statute's plain language in an effort to
give effect to the legislature's intent, to the degree it

28 Animals
28k66 Injuries to Persons
28k66.7 k. Horses and other equines. Most
Cited Cases
Contracts 95 €=^114
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
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95k 114 k. Exemption from liability. Most
Cited Cases
The Limitations on Liability for Equine and
Livestock Activities Act, which states that it protects an equine sponsor from liability arising from
the inherent risks of equine activities "unless" the
sponsor is negligent, merely defines the limit of the
Act's benefits to sponsors, and leaves undisturbed
sponsors' common-law right to contractually limit
their liability for acts of ordinary negligence.
West's U.C.A. § 788-4-202(2).
1.10] Release 331 C=>1
331 Release
3311 Requisites and Validity
331 k 1 k. Nature and requisites in general.
Most Cited Cases
The main purpose of a release typically is the
voluntary relinquishment of a claim or right by one
who, absent the release, could have enforced such a
claim or right.

to satisfy the preferences of a judge rather than the
will of the people or the intentions of the Legislature; the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as
a basis for judicial determinations, if at all, only
with the utmost circumspection.
[13] Contracts 95 €=>108(1)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95k 108 Public Policy in General
95k 108(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
For a contract to be void on the basis of public
policy, there must be a showing free from doubt
that the contract is against public policy.
114] Contracts 95 €=>114

! fij Contracts 95 €^>114
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95k 1.14 k. Exemption from liability. Most
Cited Cases
Pre-injury releases must be compatible with
public policy.

95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95k 1.14 k. Exemption from liability. Most
Cited Cases
Generally, public policy does not foreclose the
opportunity of parties to bargain for the waiver of
tort claims based on ordinary negligence.

112 j Courts 106<O?87

[15] Constitutional Law 92 €=>2488

106 Courts
10611 Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k87 k. Nature of judicial determination. Most Cited Cases
Courts proceed with great caution when considering whether to invoke public policy as a basis
for judicial determinations, because public policy is
a protean substance that is too often easily shaped

92 Constitutional Law
92XX Separation of Powers
92XX(C) Judicial Powers and Functions
92XX(C)2 Encroachment on Legislature
92k2485 Inquiry Into Legislative Judgment
92k2488 k. Policy. Most Cited
Cases
To pluck a principle of public policy from the
text of a statute and to ground a decision of the
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court on that principle is to invite judicial mischief.
*1050 Robert D. Sirieper, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
H. Burt Ringvvood and A. Joseph Sano, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees.
Before Judges DAVIS, VOROS, and CHRISTIANSEN.
OPINION
VOROS, Judge:
S 1 Lisa Penunuri appeals the trial court's order
denying her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against Sundance Partners, LTD, and other named
appellees (collectively, Sundance) and dismissing
as a matter of law her claims based on ordinary
negligence. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
5 2 On August 1, 2007, Penunuri and two
friends participated in a guided horseback ride operated by Sundance. The party consisted of five
riders and one guide. The riders were arrayed in
single file with the guide in front and Penunuri in
the rear. The rider directly in front of Penunuri was
an eight-year-old girl. The girl had problems controlling her horse; as a result, gaps formed in the
train of riders. To keep the train together, the guide
informed the riders that she would hold the reins of
the eight-year-old's horse. However, before the
guide could do so, Penunuri's horse suddenly accelerated to catch up with the other horses. The unexpected acceleration allegedly caused Penunuri to
fall off her horse and suffer serious injuries. Sundance's instructional manual for horseback riding
guides cautioned that horses that lag behind tend to
accelerate quickly to catch up with the group.
5 3 Before participating in the ride, Penunuri
signed a Release & Indemnity Agreement (the Release), which purported to release Sundance from
any claims arising from its ordinary negligence:

I expressly agree to assume all risks of personal
injury, falls, accidents, and/or property damage,
including those resulting from any negligence of
Sundance....
J 4 Penunuri filed suit against Sundance alleging negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious
liability. She then filed a Motion and Memorandum
for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief, arguing that the Release is unenforceable under
the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (the Equine Act), see Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78B-4-201 to -203 (2008). The trial
court ruled that the Equine Act did *1051 not prevent a party from contracting away its liability for
ordinary negligence and thus ruled the Release enforceable. It accordingly dismissed all of Penunuri's
claims based on ordinary negligence. Penunuri appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
5 5 Penunuri contends that the trial court erred
by denying her motion for partial summary judgment and by ruling that the Release was enforceable. More specifically, she argues that the plain
language of the Equine Act prevents an equine
sponsor from limiting its liability for ordinary negligence with a pre-injury release. In addition, she
argues that public policy as expressed in the Equine
Act prohibits such releases.
|i|(2| 5 6 Summary judgment is appropriate
where "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We
"review[ ] a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and viewj j the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Bingham v.
Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37. J 10, 235 P.3d
730. In addition, "[w]e review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation." In re S.C..
1999 UT App 251,5 8, 987 P.2d 611 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ANALYSIS
| 3 | | 4 ] | 5 | 5 7 "In general, the common law disfavors agreements that indemnify parties against
their own negligence because one might be careless
of another's life and limb, if there is no penalty for
carelessness." Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94.51 14.
37 P.3d 1062 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, generally, "those who are not engaged in public service may properly bargain
against liability for harm caused by their ordinary
negligence in performance of [a] contractual duty;
but such an exemption is always invalid if it applies
to harm wilfully inflicted or caused by gross or
wanton negligence:' hi. J 9 (quoting 6A Arthur
Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 1472, at
596-97 (1962)). Thus, in Utah, as in a majority of
states, generally "people may contract away their
rights to recover in tort for damages caused by the
ordinary negligence of others." Pearce v. Utah Athletic FonmL. 2008 UT 13, 3 14, 179 P.3d 760; see
also Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.. 2007 UT 96,11 6,
175 P.3d 560 ("We have joined the majority of jurisdictions in permitting people to surrender their
rights to recover in tort for the negligence of others.").

statute.... No clause 1,1 sentence or word shall be
construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the
construction can be found which will give force to
and preserve all the words of the statute.' " State v.
Maestas, 2002 UT 123, J 53,63 P.3d 621 (omission
and alteration in original) (quoting 2A Norman J.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:06
(4th ed. 1984)).
J 10 Penunuri contends that the Release violates the express terms of the Equine Act. Section
202 of the Equine Act shields an equine sponsor
from liability for the inherent risks associated with
equine activities, unless the sponsor engages in
negligence, gross negligence, willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, or intentionally injurious conduct:
*1052 An equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity sponsor, or livestock
professional is not liable for an injury to or the
death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities, unless the sponsor
or professional:
(a)(i) provided the equipment or tack;

5 8 Penunuri first contends that the plain language of the Equine Act renders the Release unenforceable. She also contends that the Release offends public policy established by the Equine Act.
We consider each contention in turn.

(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury;
and

A. The Language of the Equine Act Does Not Invalidate the Release.
[6||7][8| J 9 "To interpret a statute, we always
look first to the statute's plain language in an effort
to give effect to the legislature's intent, to the degree it can be so discerned." In re Olympus Consfr.,
LC. 2009 UT 29, S 10, 215 P.3d 129. To determine
the meaning of the plain language, we examine the
statute "in harmony with other statutes in the same
chapter and related chapters." LP! Servs. v. McGee,
2009 UT 41,8 11,215 P.3d 135 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, " 'effect must be given,
if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a

(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the activity
with the participant;

(Hi) the equipment failure was due to the
sponsor's or professional's negligence;

(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in legal possession
and control of land or facilities upon which the
participant sustained injuries because of a dangerous condition which was known to or
should have been known to the sponsor or professional and for which warning signs have not
been conspicuously posted;
(d)(i) commits an act or omission that consti-
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tutes negligence, gross negligence, or willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of the participant; and
(ii) that act or omission causes the injury; or
(e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to
the participant.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B~4~202(2) (2008)
FN i
(emphasis added).
FN I. This section was renumbered and
amended after the instant case arose, but
the relevant portions have not changed. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202 amend,
notes (2008). We cite to the current version of the statute for the reader's convenience.
5 11 Penunuri argues that the "plain language
provides that [Sundance) is not to be held liable for
inherent risks associated with equine activity yet
must be held liable for its acts or omissions of negligence." (Emphasis added.) She further argues that
enforcing the Release "would make everything after
'unless' in [section 202(2) ] superfluous." Sundance
responds that while the Act is designed to ensure
that equine activity sponsors would not be liable for
specified inherent risks, "nothing in the Act suggests that the Legislature intended to change or alter the liability of equine sponsors for noninherent
risks or the contractual protections that might be afforded to them through a release." As noted above,
Utah case law recognizes that pre-injury releases
releasing a party from liability for its own negligence are generally enforceable. Thus, in effect,
Penunuri asks us to read section 202 to overrule
that case law insofar as equine and livestock activities are concerned.
J 12 The principal obstacle to reading section
202 to invalidate pre-injury releases is that it does
not mention releases. " Accordingly, if section
202 invalidates pre-injury releases, it does so by
implication only. As it applies to this case, section

202 is clear that an equine activity sponsor is protected from liability for the injury or death of a participant due to the inherent risks of equine activity
unless the sponsor is negligent, grossly negligent,
or worse. But what then? According to Penunuri,
once negligence is established, the Equine Act
mandates liability, subject only to statutory defenses. According to Sundance, once negligence is
established, the Equine Act ceases to apply, and the
case becomes a garden variety negligence case controlled by the rules governing such cases, including
common law defenses.
FN2. The same is true of the legislative
history to which Penunuri directs our attention.
|9| J 13 Reading this language to abrogate
common law defenses, invalidate pre-injury releases, and mandate liability stretches the statutory
language past its plain meaning. We agree with
Sundance and the trial court that section 202 protects a sponsor from liability arising from the inherent risks of equine activities unless the sponsor is
negligent, in which case it offers no protection.
However, the sponsor remains free to assert all other applicable defenses, including, if appropriate, release. The "unless" clause thus defines the limit of
the Act's benefits to sponsors; it does not impose
new burdens upon them. The Equine Act therefore
*1053 leaves undisturbed case law permitting sponsors to contractually limit their liability for acts of
ordinary negligence. See generally Russ v. Woodside Homes. Inc., 905 P.2d 90K 904 (Utah
Ci.App.1995) ("Generally, parties ... may properly
bargain against liability from harm caused by their
ordinary negligence."). This reading does not
render the language following "unless" superfluous,
as Penunuri argues. That language is still given its
desired effect, which is to circumscribe the protecFN 3
tions offered by the Equine Act.
FN 3. Because our supreme court has declined—albeit in a noncommercial setting—to "extend strict liability to owners
and keepers of horses," see Pullan v. Stein-
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men. 2000 UT 103.11 7. 16 P.3d 1245, one
might question whether the negligence exception to the Equine Act's coverage circumscribes its protections to the point of
rendering them illusory.
i 101 S 14 Thus construed, section 202 is in harmony with section 203 of the Equine Act. See LP!
Servs. v. McGee. 2009 UT 41, S 11, 215 P.3d 135
(stating that statutes are to be read in harmony with
other statutes in the same chapter). Section 203 requires equine or livestock activity sponsors to
provide notice to participants that the sponsor is not
liable for certain inherent risks of the equine activity. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-203O) (2008).
This notice may be provided by posting a sign in a
prominent location or by "providing a document or
release for the participant ... to sign." Id. §
78B-4-203(2)(b) (emphasis added). We do not read
the word "release" in this section to refer merely to
a document notifying the participant that the sponsor is insulated against claims arising from certain
inherent risks of participating in the activity. Because the statutory term "document" already conveys this meaning, such a reading would impermissibly render "release" redundant. See State v.
Maestas, 2002 UT 123,S 53, 63 P.3d 621... Furthermore, a release does more than provide notice.
"The main purpose of a release typically is the voluntary relinquishment of a claim or right by one
who, absent the release, could have enforced such a
claim or right." 66 Am Jur.2d Releases § 1 (2010).
We therefore conclude that section 203 presupposes
the continued use of releases between equine activity sponsors and participants. Given the other provisions of the statute, a release in this context can
have only one purpose, which is to release in advance a sponsor from liability for that sponsor's ordinary negligence. Accordingly, we conclude that
the plain language of the Equine Act does not invalidate the Release.
B. Public Policy as Expressed in the Equine Act
Does Not Invalidate the Release.
111 li 121[13| J 15 Penunuri next contends that

the Release violates public policy as expressed in
FN4
the Equine Act. ' It is well settled that preinjury
releases must be compatible with public policy."
Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, J 15,
179 P.3d 760. However, we proceed with great caution when considering whether to invoke public
policy as a basis for judicial determinations:
FN4. Penunuri does not argue that the Release violates public policy under the socalled Tunkl standard. See generally
Hawkins v. Peart. 2001 UT 94, J 9 n. 3, 37
P.3d 1062 (discussing the public policy
standard set forth in Tunkl v. Regents of the
University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92. 32
Cal.Rplr. 33. 383 P.2d 441. 445-46 (1963)
).
[PJublic policy is a protean substance that is too
often easily shaped to satisfy the preferences of a
judge rather than the will of the people or the intentions of the Legislature.... [TJhe theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given
circumstances from constitutional or statutory
provisions, should be accepted as a basis for judicial determinations, if at all, only with the utmost
circumspection.
Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp,, 2007 UT 96. J 10,
175 P.3d 560 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Fairfield his. Co. v. Stephens Martin
Paving. LP, 246 S.WJd 653, 672 (Tex.2008)
("[PJublic policy ... is a very unruly horse, and
when once you get astride it you never know
where it will carry you." (quoting Richardson v.
Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep.
294,303)). "For a contract to be void on the basis
of public policy, there must be a showing free
from doubt that a contract is against public
policy." *1054Ockey v\ Lehmet\ 2008 UT 37. 5
21, 189 P.3d 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
|14| J 16 Generally, "our public policy does
not foreclose the opportunity of parties to bargain
for the waiver of tort claims based on ordinary neg-
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ligence." Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT
87,1) 15. 171 P.3d 442, However, Penunuri argues
that the Equine Act establishes a public policy prohibiting an equine sponsor from limiting its liability
for negligence via a pre-injury release. She analogizes to the Utah Supreme Court's invalidation of a
pre-injury release based on public policy grounds
under Utah's Inherent Risks of Skiing Act (the Skiing Act). See generally Rothstein. 2007 UT 96, 175
P.3d 560; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-5! to -54
(2002&Supp.2007).
5 17 In Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT
96, 175 P.3d 560. a skier collided with a retaining
wall and was injured. See id. 11 1. He sued the ski
resort, alleging negligence. See id. The trial court
granted the ski resort's motion for summary judgment based on two release and indemnity agreements signed by the skier. See id. J 5. The agreements provided that the skier waived all claims,
"including those caused by [the resort's] negligence." IcL 1j 4. The supreme court reversed in a
3-2 decision, holding that the releases violated public policy as declared in the Skiing Act. See id. 5 1.
3 18 The first section of the Skiing Act contains an extensive statement of its public policy underpinnings:
"The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is
practiced by a large number of residents of Utah
and attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this
state. It further finds that few insurance carriers
are willing to provide liability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the premiums
charged by those carriers have risen sharply in recent years due to confusion as to whether a skier
assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing.
It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify
the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks
inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of
law that certain risks are inherent in that sport,
and to provide that, as a matter of public policy,
no person engaged in that sport shall recover
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from

those inherent risks:'
Id. J 12 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51
(2002 & Supp.2007)). Based on that public policy
statement, the Rothstein court observed that the Legislature found it "necessary to immunize ski area
operators from liability for injuries caused by inherent risks because they were otherwise being denied
insurance coverage or finding coverage too expensive to purchase." Id. 5 14. The court thus reasoned
that "[t|he central purpose of the [Skiing] Act ...
was to permit ski area operators to purchase insurance at affordable rates." Id. J 15 A public policy
"bargain [was] struck by the [Skiing] Act," the
court held, which provided that "ski area operators
would be freed from liability for inherent risks of
skiing so that they could continue to shoulder responsibility for noninherent risks by purchasing insurance." Id. S 16, Because the purpose of the Skiing Act was to provide ski resorts with the ability to
purchase affordable liability insurance, the court
held that the Legislature had determined that ski resorts could not "use pre-injury releases to significantly pare back or even eliminate their need to purchase the very liability insurance the [Skiing] Act
was designed to make affordable." Id. Accordingly,
the court held that the releases offended public
policy. See id.
1151 5 19 Penunuri argues that the Equine Act
"was intended to mirror" the Skiing Act and that
the two acts are "nearly identical." She argues,
therefore, that the Equine Act struck the same bargain as the Skiing Act and thus prohibits pre-injury
releases for negligence. Penunuri points out that
both statutes "limit participants from recovering
from inherent risks of the sport. Both define the inherent risks as those that are integral to the sport.
Both acts require that the operator or sponsor post a
sign listing the inherent risks. Both acts permit a
participant to recover from acts of the sponsor or
operator's negligence." Notwithstanding those similarities, however, only the Skiing Act includes a
declaration of public policy. That public policy declaration was *1055 the centerpiece of Rothstein.
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From it, the supreme court gleaned "ftjhe central
purpose of the |Skiing] Act," id. II 15, and extrapolated "the bargain struck by the [Skiing] Act," id. 5
16. which supported its ultimate holding that Snowbird's releases were invalid. See id. "Few legislative
expressions of public policy speak more clearly to
an issue," the court noted, "than the public policy
rationale for Utah's ... Skiing Act speaks to preinjury releases for negligence." Id. 3 1I > The Equine
Act has no equivalent statement of public policy. In
fact, it has no statement of public policy at all. We
are instead left with only the text of the Equine Act
from which to deduce a public policy. Roiksiein itself warns that "[t]o pluck a principle of public
policy from the text of a statute and to ground a decision of this court on that principle is to invite judicial mischief." Id. 3 10. Consequently, we decline
M
FN5
+ .
to do so.

cordingly, while the supreme court in Rothstein had
a basis in the Skiing Act to invalidate pre-injury releases, we see no equivalent basis in the Equine Act
for doing the same.
3 21 Affirmed.
3 22 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Presiding
Judge and M1CHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, Judge.
UtahApp.,2011.
Penunurli v. Sundance Partners, Ltd.
257 P.3d 1049, 684 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 2011 UT
App 183
END OF DOCUMENT

FN5. In Street v. Darwin Ranch, inc., 75
F.Supp.2d 1296 (D.C.Wyo.1999), a rider
suing a dude ranch for a fall from a horse
on a trail ride sought to invalidate a preinjury release based on the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act. See id. at 1297. Similar to the Equine Act, the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act shields providers of recreational activities from claims based on the
inherent risks of those activities. See id.
(citing Wyo, Star. Aon. § 1—1—123 (1999)).
The court concluded, "The Release is, at
the very least, consistent with the public
policy expressed by the Act, if not in furtherance of it." Id. at 1300-01.
CONCLUSION
3 20 The plain language of the Equine Act
provides statutory protection to equine sponsors for
inherent risks of equine activities. The portion of
the Equine Act excluding negligent, grossly negligent, and intentional acts from its protection does
not invalidate pre-injury releases of ordinary negligence. In addition, while the Equine Act and the
Skiing Act share a number of similarities, only the
latter features a declaration of public policy. Ac-
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